Hitler's Secret Speech to the German Press, 10 November 1938
Hitler's Secret Speech to the German Press, 10 November 1938
Source: J. Noakes & G. Pridham, Documents on Nazism 1919-1945, (London, 1974), pp.549-550.
We have set ourselves several tasks this year which we want to achieve through our propaganda - and I consider the press present here among the top instruments of propaganda. First, the gradual preparation of the German People themselves. For years circumstances have compelled me to talk about almost nothing but peace. Only by continually stressing Germany's desire for peace and her peaceful intentions could I achieve freedom for the German people bit by bit and provide the armaments which were always necessary before the next step could be taken. It is obvious that such peace propaganda also has its doubtful aspects, for it can only too easily give people the idea that the present regime really identifies itself with the determination to preserve peace at all costs. That would not only lead to a wrong assessment of the aims of this system, but above all it might lead to the German nation, instead of being prepared for every eventuality, being filled with a spirit of defeatism which in the long run would inevitably undermine the success of the present regime. It was only out of necessity that for years I talked of peace. But it was now necessary gradually to re-educate the German people psychologically and to make it clear that there are things, which must be achieved by force if peaceful means fail. To do this, it was necessary not to advocate force as such, but to depict to the German people certain diplomatic events in such a light that the inner voice of the nation itself gradually began to call for the use of force. That meant, to portray certain events in such a way that the conviction automatically grew in the minds of the broad mass of the people: If things cannot be settled amicably, force will have to be used, but in any case things cannot go on like this. This work took months; it was begun according to plan, carried out according to plan, and intensified. Many people did not understand this, gentlemen; many thought all this was rather exaggerated. Those were the over-cultured intellectuals who have no idea, even when the thunder and lightning start, how one gets a nation to stand together. ... Furthermore, it was necessary to use the press and other propaganda methods to influence the enemy, which confronted us, namely Czechoslovakia. There may have been some people who did not understand many of the measures taken during the past few years.
Gentlemen! After 21 May it was quite clear that this problem had to be solved one way or another [so order so]! Each further postponement could only make it more difficult and make its solution more bloody. Now we know also that it was, I would say, the last moment at which this problem could be solved in the way it was solved. One thing is certain, gentlemen: a delay of only one or two years would have put us into an extraordinarily difficult situation from the military point of view. Our enemies in the rest of the world would have remained. The aircraft carrier in the heart of Germany, i.e. Czechoslovakia, would have strengthened and fortified itself more and more, and gradually all the additional weapons produced by our rearmament programme would have been swallowed up by the task of having to solve this problem first before tackling any other. ... I would like to state now that this propaganda has worked superbly this year, quite superbly and that the press has got completely used to this work and that I personally looked through the numerous German papers each day with great pleasure. ... The greatness of this success became clearest to me at that moment when, for the first time, I stood in the middle of the Czech fortifications. Then it became clear to me what it means to capture nearly 2000 km. of fortifications without having fired a shot. Gentlemen, this time we really have gained 10 million people with over 100,000 square km. through propaganda in the service of an idea. That is tremendous! Gentlemen, it used to be my greatest pride to have built up a Party that stood behind me steadfastly and fanatically even in bad times - especially in bad times. That was my greatest pride and a tremendous comfort. We must get the whole German people to do this. They must learn to believe in final victory so fanatically that even if we were occasionally defeated, the nation would regard it from an overall point of view and say: This is a temporary phase; victory will be ours in the end! It was a Prussian general who best illustrated this character trait - Bluecher, the man who was perhaps more defeated than anyone else, but who had a fanatical belief in final victory, and that was what mattered. We must educate our whole nation to that end. They must be educated to the absolute, steadfast, optimistic belief that in the end we will achieve all that is necessary. We can only succeed in this by a continuous appeal to the strength of the nation, by stressing the qualities of the nation and by disregarding the so-called negative sides as much as possible. To achieve this, it is also necessary for the press in particular to hold blindly to the principle: The leadership is always right! Gentlemen, we must all be allowed to make mistakes. Newspapermen are not exempt from that danger either. But all of us can only survive if we do not let the world see our mistakes but only the positive things. In other words, it is necessary, by removing any possibility of admitting mistakes or of argument, always to stress the correctness of the leadership. That is the decisive point. ...
